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Abstract. Agreement, cooperation and trust would be straightforward
if deception did not ever occur in communicative interactions. Humans
have deceived one another since the species began. Do machines deceive
one another or indeed humans? If they do, how may we detect this? To
detect machine deception, arguably requires a model of how machines
may deceive, and how such deception may be identified. Theory of Mind
(ToM) provides the opportunity to create intelligent machines that are
able to model the minds of other agents. The future implications of a
machine that has the capability to understand other minds (human or
artificial) and that also has the reasons and intentions to deceive oth-
ers are dark from an ethical perspective. Being able to understand the
dishonest and unethical behaviour of such machines is crucial to current
research in AI. In this paper, we present a high-level approach for mod-
elling machine deception using ToM under factors of uncertainty and we
propose an implementation of this model in an Agent-Oriented Program-
ming Language (AOPL). We show that the Multi-Agent Systems (MAS)
paradigm can be used to integrate concepts from two major theories of
deception, namely Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2) and In-
terpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), and how to apply these concepts
in order to build a model of computational deception that takes into ac-
count ToM. To show how agents use ToM in order to deceive, we define
an epistemic agent mechanism using BDI-like architectures to analyse
deceptive interactions between deceivers and their potential targets and
we also explain the steps in which the model can be implemented in
an AOPL. To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the first
attempts in AI that (i) uses ToM along with components of IMT2 and
IDT in order to analyse deceptive interactions and (ii) implements such
a model.
Keywords Deception; Theory of Mind; Agent-Oriented Programming
Languages; Machine Deception
Accepted for publication in AI COMMUNICATIONS Journal SI: Agree-
ment Technologies, ed. Marin Lujak
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1 Introduction
The idea of deceptive machines dates back to Turing’s imitation game: ‘...It is A’s
object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong identification...’ [29].
We believe that the main reasons to study deception are: (i) because deception is
fundamental to a comprehensive theory of communication; and (ii) because some
day autonomous agents might have reasons to employ deception [6]. Machines
that have the reasons and capability to deceive pose a serious future threat
to the relation between humans and AI. This is especially threatening to the
relation of trust between humans and artificial agents. Therefore, it is reasonable
to think that humans might adopt a sceptical attitude towards AI. We aim to
understand these autonomous agents by looking at (i) how deceptive interactions
emerge from various contexts; and (ii) what are the possible outcomes of these
interactions assuming that agents already have reasons to employ deception,
while paying close attention to sceptical attitudes of agents.
We consider that our study is a multi-disciplinary one in the sense that it
enriches both the AI literature and the literature in communication theory. To
AI, it adds two main contributions: (i) a model of deception for Multi-Agent
Systems (MAS) that includes ToM and uses ToM to integrate components of
two major theories of deception: here we describe (a) how agents use ToM in
order to deceive (or not) in scenarios of uncertainty, and (b) how adding agent
profiles to this model influences the agents’ actions by taking into account the
likelihood of deception and trust between agents; (ii) a broadly applicable ap-
proach for implementing the model in Agent-Oriented Programming Language
(AOPL) where (a) agents are able not only to model the other agents’ minds but
also (b) to execute reasoning and simulation over these representations under
factors of uncertainty4. Another contribution to AI is the understanding of how
machines that have the reasons and capability to deceive are able to interact
with other agents and what type of behaviour emerges from these interactions
that can impact the relation of trust between agents. For communication the-
ory, our study represents the first attempt to integrate the components of two
major theories of deception, with the help of AI methods, namely Interpersonal
Deception Theory (IDT) and Information Manipulation Thoery 2 (IMT2). IDT
is the theory that explains how the communicative skills and cognitive load of
individuals affect deceptive interactions [4], whereas IMT2 is the theory that ex-
plains how individuals employ deception by manipulating information [18]. Even
though there are many studies in the AI literature that look at deception, none
of them uses IMT2, IDT and ToM together to model interactions that involve
deceptive artificial agents.
4 The implementation is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybj343wf, thus showing the
compatibility between our formalisation and AOPLs.
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2 Theory of Mind & Components of Deception
ToM is the ability of humans to ascribe elements such as beliefs, desires, and
intentions, and relations between these elements to other human agents. In other
words, it is the ability to form mental models of other agents. One version of
ToM is the Theory-Theory of Mind (henceforth TT). TT can be described as
a theory based approach of assigning states to other agents. While some argue
TT is nothing else but folk psychology, others say that it is a more scientific way
of mind-reading [10]. Another version is Simulation Theory of Mind (henceforth
ST). Adopting Goldman’s description of it, Barlassina and Gordon explain it as
‘process-driven rather than theory-driven’ [1]. Thus, ST emphasises the process
of putting oneself into another’s shoes. TT argues for a hypothesis testing method
of model extraction, whereas ST argues for a simulation based method for model
selection.
That being said, ToM seems to be able to provide machines with the ability
to model their opponent’s minds [11]. [14] also argue that ToM is crucial for
machines to be able to deceive and detect deception. How could a machine be
able to reason successfully about the beliefs of other agents if it does not have
some knowledge and understanding of its targets’ minds? Deception is, after all,
a process of epistemic nature.
As mentioned before, IMT2 focuses on how agents manipulate information
to deceive. In particular, IMT2 makes reference to the Mannheim School’s psy-
chological models of speech-act production [12], implying that information ma-
nipulation is related to two main reasoning processes that determine speech
production: (i) Pars Pro Toto, which means ‘parts for the whole’ and refers to
the process of selecting only the necessary information from a certain context
that is sufficient for conveying the entire meaning implied by the speech act;
and (ii) Totum Ex Parte, which means ‘the whole from the parts’ and refers to
the process used to infer the entire meaning implied by a speech act, given the
limited information received through the speech act and the information that is
implicit in that situation/context.
IDT argues that there exists a set of social constraints that influence the
ability of agents to deceive and detect deception. The most important social
constraints are 1) the trust between agents, which determines whether an agent
believes in the information provided by another agent or chooses to believe the
opposite; 2) the communicative skill of the agents that determine how skilled
are the agents at deceiving and detecting deception; 3) the cognitive load of the
agents that determines how much information can agents handle in order to
succeed in deceptive interactions; the greater the cognitive load, the higher the
risk of agents getting caught due to the unintended leaking of information.
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3 Modelling Deception
We consider deception to be different from lying and from bullshitting5. We
define deception as:
Definition 1 (Deception) The intention of a deceptive agent, which we name
Donald, to make another interrogator agent, which we will call Ivan, to believe
something is true that Donald believes is false, with the aim of achieving an
ulterior goal or desire.
To model deception, we make use of ToM by combining TT with ST. TT
enables us to pre-assign beliefs of agents about each other’s beliefs, whereas ST
enables agents to simulate other agents’ beliefs when they get new information
in order to update their TT.
We proceed to build the model by using BDI-like formalisations. Thus the
model consists of several sub-components such as: (i) an epistemic component
which represents the beliefs and desires of agents (this includes beliefs of other
agents’ beliefs), (ii) an event component that represents the actions performed
by the agents such as asking and answering questions, (iii) and a component that
represents how the agents update their beliefs based on ToM and agent profiles.
Definition 2 (Agents) Ag represents an agent. When we need to make the
distinction between two agents we use Agi and Agj, representing two distinct
agents in a set of n agents. The complete set of our agents is A = {Dec, Int},
where Dec is Donald and Int is Ivan.
Definition 3 (Beliefs and Desires) If ψ represents a predicate from a logical
language, then BAg(ψ) represents a belief of an agent Ag in ψ and DAg(ψ)
represents a desire of ψ that belongs to an agent Ag.
Definition 4 (Actions) We define QAg(ψ) as a question asked by Ag if ψ is
the case, and AAg(ψ) as an answer by Ag saying that ψ is the case.
Definition 5 (Theory of Mind (ToM)) A belief or a set of beliefs of an agent
Agi about another agent Agj where: BAgi(BAgj (ψ)) is a belief of an agent Agi
of another agent Agj’s belief that ψ.
Definition 6 (Ignorance) If ψ represents a predicate from a logical language,
and BAg(ψ) represents a belief of an agent Ag in ψ, BAg(ψ) represents that the
agent Ag is ignorant about the truth (or falsity) of ψ .
Definition 7 (Trust Rule) AAgi(ψ) → BAgj (ψ) represents the general as-
sumption that if Agi tells Agj that ψ is the case, then Agj will believe that
ψ is the case.
5 In [25] and in [14] the authors explain the complexities of machine deception, and in
[20], as well as in [5, ?], the formal, computational and implementational differences
between the three forms of dishonesty are treated.
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To model deceptive interaction, we make agents use ToM to execute Pars Pro
Toto and Totum Ex Parte. Donald will execute Pars Pro Toto by combining TT
with ST, while Ivan will execute Totum Ex Parte using only TT.
Definition 8 (Theory-Theory (TT)) The prior beliefs that an agent Agi has
of the beliefs of another agent Agj.
Definition 9 (Simulation-Theory (ST)) The process that an agent Agi en-
gages in to derive new beliefs of another agent Agj’s beliefs, starting from Agi’s
TT about Agj and assuming some new information is received by Agj.
Definition 10 (Pars Pro Toto) The process executed by an agent Agi to choose
an answer AAgi using its TT of another agent Agj and simulating an ST of Agj,
that will cause the other agent Agj to be deceived.
Definition 11 (Totum Ex Parte) The process executed by an agent Agi to
infer something that it desires to know DAgi(BAgi) from a given context that
consists of answers provided by another agent AAgj , the Trust Rule, and Agi’s
TT and beliefs.
Definition 12 (Successful Deception) A successful deception is when the fi-
nal conclusion reached by Ivan is a belief that Donald desires Ivan to reach but
it is also a belief about something to be true that Donald believes to be false.
3.1 Preconditions
In order for an interaction between two agents to be called deceptive, that is to
potentially result in successful or failed deception given our model, the interaction
should satisfy a set of precondictions that follow from Definitions 1, 2, 3, 5 and
6. We consider that if the following three preconditions are satisfied by a given
system of at least two agents, then deceptive interactions can happen within
that given system.
Precondition 1 (Known Unknown). Ivan has some missing knowl-
edge about the world such that it is aware of this missing knowledge.
Precondition 1 is not a strong precondition to be satisfied. Ivan does not
necessarily need to be aware of something it does not know. Donald can provide
an information that Ivan never thought about finding out in the first place, and
by finding out that information, Ivan can infer a belief about something else that
is false. We mainly use this precondition in order to show that Ivan will decide to
act on its lack of knowledge by asking Donald about Ivan’s desired information.
Without this precondition, Ivan would not have to ask anyone about something
Ivan is aware of not knowing. What Ivan desires is to reach a state of shared
beliefs [7] with Donald given its TT ToM of Donald as agents manage to reach
in [21] and [27].
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Precondition 2 (Unknown Unknown). Ivan is initially not aware
of the belief Donald desires Ivan to reach.
We consider that Precondition 2 is a strong precondition to be satisfied by
the system in the current form of our model. If Ivan is already aware of the
conclusion Donald desires it to reach, then it means that Ivan already has the
knowledge (true or false) and thus, Ivan cannot be caused by Donald to have
this knowledge. Also, if Ivan already believes something to be true that Donald
wants Ivan to believe is false, then Ivan must somehow decide which belief is true
or false and this is bound to increase the complexity of the reasoning processes
of Ivan. Furthermore, in order to represent deception at an even deeper level,
Donald would have to take into consideration the decision protocol of Ivan on its
final conclusion. Such interactions are very interesting and worthy to be further
explored, but they are currently beyond the scope of this paper.
Precondition 3 (Theory of the Target’s Mind). Donald has a
ToM of Ivan.
We also consider Precondition 3 to be a strong precondition. The argument
for this consideration is that: it is impossible for Donald to know what Ivan might
infer from information that Donald is able to provide, unless Donald knows what
Ivan knows and is able to reason in the way Ivan reasons about what Ivan knows.
Therefore, Precondition 3 must stand if any deceptive interaction is to take place.
If Precondition 3 does not stand, and Ivan infers a belief that something is true
when Donald believes that something to be false, then such an outcome of the
system cannot be attributed to a deceptive interaction because such an outcome
is not necessarily caused by an action that Donald reasoned deceptively and
rationally about. Donald could not have possibly engaged in such a reasoning
process, because such a process requires Donald to have a model of Ivan’s mind.
Such an outcome might just be determined by some random action performed
by Donald and, therefore cannot be called deception (see Def. 1).
3.2 Parameters
We assume that the agents, Donald and Ivan, are constrained by two parameters
from IDT, namely trust and communicative skill. We proceed to define a value
α that represents the degree of Ivan’s trust in the information that Donald is
providing. Another assumption, inspired by IDT, is that Donald has some sort of
skill that it uses to read Ivan’s trust. We add this parameter as the communicative
skill of Donald and label it β.
On top of the parameters from IDT, we also add a degree of confidence γ
that Donald has in its TT of Ivan. This is important because we want to show
how Donald executes Pars Pro Toto under uncertainty. A final assumption is
that Donald has to estimate its chance of deception before feeding Ivan any
information. We add a success estimation parameter and label it with θ.
Modelling Deception using Theory of Mind in Multi-Agent Systems 7
We do not provide a model for computing α, β, and γ, because that would
change the focus of the paper. The scope of this paper is to show that given some
degree of skills, uncertainty about ToM and trust among agents, it is possible to
model deception. For an in-depth analysis of how to compute such parameters
see [9].
3.3 Aggregating Parameters
We choose to aggregate the labels using conditional probabilities in order to
show how trust, communicative skill, ToM, and estimation of success influence
the dynamics of deception. Let us assume that Ivan does not trust Donald due to
some prior information it has about Donald. In this case we say that α has a low
probability. Whenever Donald answers Ivan’s question with ψ, Ivan will believe
that the opposite, ¬ψ, is the case. We use the following definitions to show the
computation of the interaction between trust, communicative skill, confidence in
ToM, and estimation of success:
Definition 13 (P (α)) Trust α is such that Ivan is able to estimate the proba-
bility of trust P (α) in the answer provided by Donald.
Both agents need the degree of trust (i) to estimate success (Donald) and (ii)
to trust the information provided by the other agent (Ivan).
Definition 14 (P (α, β)) Donald’s estimation of Ivan’s trust α in Donald is
conditionally dependent of Donald’s level of communicative skill β.
In order to succeed in its deception, Donald needs to make Ivan believe what
Donald is telling Ivan. To do this under the assumption of uncertainty, Donald
needs access to Ivan’s degree of trust.
Definition 15 (P (θ)) Donald’s estimation of its own success θ in deceiving
Ivan is the conditional probability of Donald’s access to Ivan’s trust in Don-
ald given by the probability P (α, β) and Donald’s confidence in its own ToM of
Ivan given by the probability P (γ); P (θ) = P (α, β) ∗ P (γ).
3.4 Agent Architectures
When reasoning about knowledge, beliefs and actions using ToM, both Donald
and Ivan are able to perform the following:
– Rational Action (RA): If a given agent Ag believes that an action ψ is
possible BAg(AAg(ψ)), then Ag is able to execute that action.
– Assumption of a Future Action (AFA): When using ST, agents are able to
make an assumption of taking an action A (answering) or Q (asking) in order
to simulate the final outcome of taking that action.
– Positive Introspection (KK): If an agent Ag has a belief of the form BAg(ψ),
then the agent is able to believe that it has that belief BAg(BAg(ψ)).
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– Modus Ponens (MP ): The rule that if an agent Ag knows that ψ → φ, and
ψ is asserted to be true, then Ag knows that φ must be true.
– Negation as Failure (NAF ): The non-monotonic rule that if a proposition ψ
cannot be derived, then ¬ψ is derived.
– Backward Induction (BI): The reasoning process that an agent Ag uses to
select an action AAg(ψ) out of a set of possible actions that will result in the
achievement of the agent’s desire/goal DAg(φ).
Choosing actions that deceive requires some types of decision making rules or
protocols. One method compatible with our model is for agents to use backward
induction: Donald explores all the possible conclusions that can be drawn by Ivan
from its answers. If Donald answers ¬ψ and it believes that Ivan is rational and
that Ivan believes that ψ → ϕ, then Donald knows that Ivan will not conclude
that ϕ. Therefore, Donald concludes that deception will fail. After modelling
the conclusion Ivan would draw if it answers ψ, Donald proceeds to check if that
conclusion matches its desire. If the conclusion of Ivan as modelled by Donald
matches Donald’s desire, then Donald will proceed to execute the action.
In order to model different attitudes of agents, we add profiles to the agents.
For now, we limit the profiles to reckless and cautious for Donald, and credulous
and sceptical for Ivan.
Deceiver Profiles:
– Reckless Ag will attempt deception even if P (θ) (estimated success) is low,
i.e., P (θ) ≥ 0.25. A reckless deceiver does not care that another agent, for
example, might misinterpret the reckless deceiver’s actions.
– Cautious Ag will only attempt deception if P (θ) is high, i.e., P (θ) ≥ 0.75.
This means that a cautious deceiver thinks that is wiser to be honest, than
to attempt deception and be caught.
Interrogator Profiles:
– Credulous Agi will mostly believe what another Agj is saying even if P (α)
is low, i.e., P (α) ≥ 0.25. A credulous interrogator is an agent that usually
does not have a default reason to distrusts others.
– Sceptical Agi will tend to distrust another Agj even if P (α) is high, i.e., Agi
will believe what Agj is saying only if P (α) ≥ 0.75. A sceptical interrogator
believes that there is always a good reason to distrust others.
Reasoning Processes:
Simulate ToM (see Def. 9 & Algorithm 1) is the reasoning process used
by Donald to see what beliefs will be reached by Ivan given some information
provided by Donald. We assume that Donald already has a TT (see Def. 8) of
Ivan’s mind, thus Donald knows what Ivan already knows. Having this knowl-
edge, Donald starts by assuming that it (Donald) will perform a certain action
that will be perceived by Ivan (see AFA). Afterwards, Donald assumes that Ivan
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believes the information that Donald provides (see Def. 7). Given Ivan’s newly
formed belief on Doanld’s information, Donald checks whether this belief is able
to generate any final belief in Ivan’s mind given Donald’s knowledge of all other
beliefs that Ivan has. If there is another belief that together with Ivan’s newly
formed belief generates a final belief in Ivan’s mind, then Donald is able to infer
that a rational Ivan will conclude this final belief. If there is no other belief in
Donald’s TT of Ivan that can generate a final belief, then Donald is able to infer
that a rational Ivan will not conclude a final belief. Simulate ToM will return
the conclusion that Ivan would infer if given a certain information.
Pars Pro Toto (see Def. 10 & Algorithm 2) is the reasoning process used
by Donald to decide which action should be performed such that the interaction
with Ivan will result in successful deception (see Def. 1). Pars Pro Toto uses
Simulate ToM as a subprocess in order to check if a certain action will make
Ivan conclude a final belief. After Donald simulates Ivan’s mind, Donald checks
whether Ivan’s conclusion matches Donald’s desire. If this is the case, then Don-
ald knows the action chosen will result in succesful deception, therefore Donald
proceeds to check the estimation of success (see Def. 14). If the estimation of
success is higher than Donald’s profile threshold (see Profiles), then Donald will
proceed to execute that chosen action (see RA). Else, Donald will choose another
action to simulate Ivan’s mind until no other actions are left to check. If there
is no possible deceptive action above Donald’s threshold, then Donald will de-
cide to not attempt deception. Pars Pro Toto will return an action that, from
Donald’s perspective, is likely to deceive Ivan or if there is no such action then
it will return an action that is not deceptive. If there is no action that according
to Simulate ToM will result in Donald’s desires, then Pars Pro Toto will
return a random action.
Totum Ex Parte (see Def. 11 & Algorithm 3) is the reasoning process
used by Ivan to find out the information Ivan desires to find out given a certain
context. If Ivan is ignorant (see Def. 6) about some information and Ivan has
a TT (see Def. 8) of an agent and knows that the agent has the information
Ivan desires to know, then Ivan will ask that agent to provide the information
and waits for the agent’s answer. After receiving the answer from the agent,
Ivan believes the answer, but also checks whether it trusts the agent that has
provided the information. If Ivan trusts the agent, then Ivan will keep believing
the information provided, otherwise Ivan will believe that the information pro-
vided is false. Either way, Ivan has achieved its goal, which is not being ignorant
anymore about the information.
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Algorithm 1: Simulate ToM
Function SimulateToM(action, belief , ToM)
let action = say(ϕ);
if ToM ∪ {ϕ} |= belief then
return True;
else
return False;
Algorithm 2: Pars Pro Toto
Data: Actions, ToM , Desire, ProfileThreshold
Result: DeceiverAction
let Desire = DDec(BInt(ϕ));
/* Backward Induction to choose deceptive action */
DeceiverAction ← ⊥;
for action in Actions do
if SimulateToM(action, ϕ, ToM) = True then
/* Estimate success of action selected using Backward
Induction */
success ← Estimate success (of deception);
if success ≥ ProfileThreshold then
DeceiverAction ← action;
if DeceiverAction = ⊥ then
DeceiverAction ← random action from Actions such that
SimulateToM(action, ϕ, ToM) = False;
4 Evaluation and Results
In this section we will present an evaluation of our model. In 4.1 we will go
through a step-by-step deceptive play to see how the beliefs of agents evolve
during a game. Then, in 4.2 we will present all possible and impossible out-
comes of interactions between Donald and Ivan given all possible combinations
of parameters and profiles. This will show us what are the contexts from which
deception emerges, and then we will discuss the results.
Donald might estimate its success (see Table 2) given its knowledge about
Ivan (see Table 1). However, its estimation might not be precise due to a possible
strong influence on Ivan by its profile (credulous or sceptical) and the real degree
of trust α (see Table 3).
If it were the case that the agents would operate on absolute knowledge,
then Donald would succeed in any given scenario due to its capacity for meta-
reasoning and access to a fully accurate ToM of Ivan. Based on the agents’
mental states in Table 1, we show a reasoning process based on the agents’ ToM
and their profiles given certain values for trust α, communicative skill β, and
certainty in ToM γ in Tables 2 and 3. We proceed to show a run of a deceptive
play using our model.
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Algorithm 3: Totum Ex Parte
Data: Beliefs, Actions, ToM , Desire, ProfileThreshold , Trust
Result: InterrogatorConclusion
let Desire = DInt(¬BInt(ψ)) ;
if ToM |= ¬BDec(ψ) and ask(ψ) ∈ Actions then
action ← ask(ψ);
else
action ← ⊥ ;
Perform action;
Receive answer ;
let answer = say(ψ);
if Trust ¿ ProfileThreshold then
Beliefs ← Beliefs ∪ {ψ};
else
Beliefs ← Beliefs ∪ {¬ψ};
if BInt(ψ) then
if Beliefs |= ϕ ∧ Beliefs \ {ψ} 6|= ϕ then
InterrogatorConclusion = ϕ ;
else
InterrogatorConclusion = ⊥;
else
InterrogatorConclusion = ⊥;
return InterrogatorConclusion;
Table 1. Agents with ToM, Labels and Profiles
Donald (Dec) with skill β Ivan (Int) with trust α
Beliefs: BDec(ψ → ϕ), BDec(¬ϕ), BDec(¬ψ)
Desires: DDec(BInt(ϕ))
Actions: ADec(ψ), ADec(¬ψ)
ToM with confidence γ: BDec(BInt(ψ → ϕ))
Profiles: reckless, cautious
Beliefs: BInt(ψ → ϕ), BInt(ψ)
Desires: DInt(¬BInt(ψ))
Actions: QInt(ψ)
ToM : BInt(¬BDec(ψ))
Profiles: credulous, sceptical
Another important observation is that given the way we set up the knowledge
bases and possible actions of the two agents Donald and Ivan in Table 1 (see
BDec(BInt(ψ → ϕ)), BDec(¬ψ), ADec(ψ) and ADec(¬ψ)), attempting deception
corresponds to Donald lying. However, that need not necessarily be the case if,
let’s say, BDec(ψ) which would create a context in which a deceptive attempt
would correspond to Donald telling the truth.
4.1 Running a Deceptive Play
Setup: cautious Donald and sceptical Ivan with the following values for trust,
communicative skill, and ToM: P(α)=0.4, P(β)=0.8, and P(γ)=0.8 (i.e., the first
case in Table 4). We run the model by assuming that Ivan asks Donald about
ψ:
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Table 2. Donald executes Pars Pro Toto to choose between two possible actions by
simulating Ivan’s belief updates using: (i) ToM of Ivan, (ii) the probabilities of α, β,
γ, and (iii) Donald’s profile.
1 BDec(BInt(ψ → ϕ)) from ToM
2 BDec(DDec(BInt(ϕ))) from Desires and KK
Donald simulates Ivan’s Mind given the first possible action.
3 BDec(ADec(ψ)) AFA and KK
4 BDec(ADec(ψ)→ BInt(ψ)) from Trust Rule and KK
5 BDec(BInt(ψ)) from 3, 4 and MP
6 BDec(BInt(ψ) ∧BInt(ψ → ϕ)) from 1, 5 and ∧I
7 BDec(BInt(ϕ)) from 6, MP , and KK
8 BDec(BInt(ϕ) ∧DDec(BInt(ϕ))) from 2, 7 and ∧I
Donald proceeds to simulate the mind of Ivan given the second (and final) possible action.
3.1 BDec(ADec(¬ψ)) AFA and KK
4.1 BDec(ADec(¬ψ)→ BInt(¬ψ)) from Trust Rule and KK
5.1 BDec(BInt(¬ψ)) from 3.1, 4.1 and MP
6.1 BDec(¬BInt(¬ψ → ϕ)) from ToM and NAF
7.1 BDec(BInt(¬ϕ)) from 5.1, 6.1, and NAF
8.1 BDec(BInt(¬ϕ) ∧DDec(BInt(ϕ))) from 2, 7.1 and ∧I
For the answer that results in achieving Donald’s goal, Donald computes the probability
of success P(θ) given P(α, β) ∧ P(γ).
Having assumed that it executes either ADec(ψ) or ADec(¬ψ), Donald has proved that
the belief of Ivan matches Donald’s desire only if Donald answers ADec(ψ). Thus,
using BI (backward induction) Donald knows that 8 implies Donald should answer ADec(ψ).
9 BDec((BInt(ϕ) ∧DDec(BInt(ϕ)))→ BDec(ADec(ψ))) from 8 and BI
10 BDec(ADec(ψ)) from 8, 9 and MP with estimated P(θ)
Donald will update its planned answer ADec(ψ) or ADec(¬ψ)
based on 10, its profile and P(θ)
11A BDec(ADec(ψ)) from 10, profile and P(θ)
11B BDec(ADec(¬ψ)) from 10, profile and P(θ)
12A ADec(ψ) from 11A and RA
12B ADec(¬ψ) from 11B and RA
Table 3. Ivan executes the second part of Totum Ex Parte after receiving Donaold’s
answer and reaches a conclusion based on (i) the answer of Donald, (ii) the probability
of α, and (iii) its profile.
1 ADec(ψ) from Table 2 (12 A)
2 BInt(ψ) from 1, Trust Rule and MP
3 BInt(ψ → ϕ) from Beliefs
4A BInt(ψ) from 1, Trust Rule, profile and P(α)
4B BInt(¬ψ) from 1, Trust Rule, profile and P(α)
5A BInt(ϕ) from 3, 4 A and MP
5B ¬BInt(ϕ) from 3, 4 B and NAF
Event 1
1. QInt(ψ) from Actions of Ivan and Totum Ex Parte
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Donald’s mind executing Pars Pro Toto
2. BDec(¬ψ) from Beliefs of Donald
3. DDec(BInt(ϕ)) from Desires of Donald
4. BDec(BInt(ψ → ϕ)) from ToM of Donald
Donald’s first simulation of Ivan’s mind
5. BDec(ADec(¬ψ)) Assumption of Donald (random from possible Actions)
6. BDec(BInt(¬ψ)) from 8 and Trust Rule
7. BDec(¬BInt(¬ψ → ϕ)) from ToM and NAF
8. BDec(¬BInt(ϕ)) from 6, 7 and NAF
First simulation: does not meet the desired outcome (see (3)). Therefore,
Donald proceeds to perform a second simulation.
Donald’s second simulation of Ivan’s mind
9. BDec(ADec(ψ)) Assumption of Donald
10. BDec(BInt(ψ)) from 12 and Trust Rule
11. BDec(BInt(ϕ)) from 7, 13, MP and KK
Second simulation: meets the desired outcome (see 3). Given a successful
outcome, Donald computes the estimation of success by aggregating the
deceptive parameters: [P (θ) = P (α, β) ∗ P (γ) = 0.32 ∗ 0.8 = 0.26], where
[P (α, β) = P (α) ∗P (β) = 0.4 ∗ 0.8 = 0.32] and P (γ) = 0.8. Donald proceeds
to the decision protocol.
Donald’s backward induction and decision using profile
12. BDec(BInt(ϕ) ∧DDec(BInt(ϕ))) from 3,11 and ∧I
13. BDec((BInt(ϕ) ∧DDec(BInt(ϕ)))→ BDec(ADec(ψ))) from 12 and BI
14. BDec(ADec(ψ)) from 13 and MP
Donald knows that it should answer ψ given 12 and BI in order to deceive
Ivan with a success rate of 0.26. Given that Donald is cautious, it does not
want to risk failure. Thus its initial planned answer BDec(ADec(ψ)) will be
updated to BDec(ADec(¬ψ)).
15. BDec(ADec(¬ψ)) from 14, cautious and P (θ) < 0.75
Event 2
16. ADec(¬ψ) from 15 and Actions
Ivan’s mind executing Totum Ex Parte
17. BInt(¬ψ) [P (α) = 0.4] from 16 and Trust Rule
Because P (α) = 0.4 and Ivan is sceptical BInt(¬ψ) will be updated to
BInt(ψ).
18. BInt(ψ) from 17, P (α) and sceptical
19. BInt(ψ → ϕ) from Beliefs of Ivan
20. BInt(ϕ) from 18, 19 and MP
4.2 Results & Analysis
Furthermore, considering the intervals of values established by the profiles in-
troduced, we have analysed in a similar manner all the possible outcomes of
deceptive plays between Donald and Ivan. The results are presented in Tables
4-7.
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Given our model, some of the outcomes are not possible due to the influence
of α on θ and due to the belief and answer update thresholds for each profile.
These are: Table 4 where P (α) = [0, .75) and P (θ) = [.75, 1]; Table 5 where
P (α) = [0, .25) and P (θ) = [.75, 1]; and Table 7 where P (α) = [0, .25) and
P (θ) = [.25, 1]. Figure 1 shows the possible outcomes for our model, given the
influence of the parameters α, β and γ.
Alph
a * B
eta
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Gamma 0.00.2
0.40.6
0.81.0
Theta
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Fig. 1. The influence of the parameters α (Alpha), β (Beta) and γ (Gamma) on θ
(Theta).
Unintended Deception: The most interesting results are: (i) in Table 4
where Donald is cautious and Ivan is sceptical, P (α) = [0, .75] and P (θ) = [0, .75];
and (ii) in Table 6 where Donald is reckless and Ivan is sceptical, P (α) =
[0, .75) and P (θ) = [0, .25). In (i) a cautious Donald meets a sceptical Ivan and
unintended deception takes place because trust α is considered low by Ivan and
because estimation of success θ is considered too low by Donald to attempt
deception. In (ii) a reckless Donald meets a sceptical Ivan, then unintended
deception takes place because trust α is considered low by Ivan and Donald lacks
confidence in its ToM of Ivan θ. Donald will decide not to attempt deception,
but Ivan thinks Donald’s answer is a lie and decides to believe that the true
answer is the opposite of what Donald said, thus reaching the conclusion that
Donald actually desires Ivan to reach.
These results of unintended deception seem to show us that sceptical agents
can indirectly act as deceptive agents themselves under certain circumstances.
Hence, it can be argued that agents that are biased towards sketpicism are not
only prone to deceive themselves, but also prone to help actual deceivers to reach
their goals without them (the actual deceivers) pro-actively chasing that goal.
In a way, these sceptical agents offer deceptive agents the option of free-reward.
That is, deceivers would maximise their potential payoffs (if there are any) by
not paying any costs for deception (if there are any).
Exploring scenarios where deceivers intentionally do not attempt deception
in order for sceptical interrogators to be ultimately deceived requires an agent
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Donald
(dec,BInt(ϕ))
BInt(ψ)α>t
(fail ,¬BInt(ϕ))
BInt(¬ψ)α<t
dec,ADec(ψ)
(¬dec,¬BInt(ϕ))
BInt(¬ψ)α>t
(fail , BInt(ϕ))
BInt(ψ)α<t
¬dec,ADec(¬ψ)
Ivan
Fig. 2. An extensive-form representation of deceptive and non-deceptive plays of Don-
ald and all of their possible outcomes. The most right-hand branch represents unin-
tended deception ; fail represents the failure of the intended attempt (dec for intend
to deceive or ¬dec for not intend to deceive).
architecture with an even higher-order of ToM than we have currently defined
in the model. To show a higher-order ToM was beyond the scope of our current
study as it was not necessary to show the raw dynamics of machine deception.
Moreover, it was sufficient not to have a higher-order ToM in order to under-
stand how skepticism can be detrimental to interrogators in particular deceptive
contexts.
5 Implementation in AOPL
Before we were able to successfully implement the model in an AOPL, we first
needed to find a way in which to represent ToM in an AOPL. The reason we had
to do this is because our model of deception relies on agents that have ToM as
a cognitive property. To model agents that model other minds, we adopted the
approach presented in [21] and [27]. First, we explain why we chose Jason as an
AOPL to implement our model and describe the approach we used for modelling
ToM in Jason using its predicates i.e., the representation of TT ToM. After that,
we describe how agents execute meta-reasoning using the TT modelling, i.e., we
describe how we implement ST as a meta-reasoning mechanism in agent-oriented
programming. Finally, we describe how agents use TT and ST to reason about
and simulate the other agents’ mind in order to make decisions. In particular,
we will show the decision-making process for deception, introduced in Section 3.
We consider that the ToM of an agent Agi is part of its belief base, i.e.,
ΠAgi ⊂ ∆Agi , and that everything an agent Agi knows that is not in ΠAgi is
considered the private knowledge of Agi.
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Table 4. Cautious vs Sceptical
P(α) P(θ) BDec ADec BInt Conclusion Deception
[0, .75)
[0, .75) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes∗
[.75, 1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No∗
[.75,1]
[0, .75) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No
[.75, 1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes
Table 5. Cautious vs Credulous
P(α) P(θ) BDec ADec BInt Conclusion Deception
[0, .25)
[0,.75) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes
[.75,1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No∗
[.25, 1]
[0,.75) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No
[.75,1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes
Table 6. Reckless vs Sceptical
P(α) P(θ) BDec ADec BInt Conclusion Deception
[0, .75)
[0,.25) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes∗
[.25,1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No
[.75, 1]
[0,.25) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No
[.25,1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes
Table 7. Reckless vs Credulous
P(α) P(θ) BDec ADec BInt Conclusion Deception
[0, .25)
[0,.25) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes
[.25,1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No∗
[.25,1]
[0,.25) ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ¬ψ ¬ψ ¬BInt(ϕ) No
[.25,1] ¬ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ψ ψ BInt(ϕ) Yes
5.1 Agent Oriented Programming Languages
Among the many AOPL and platforms discussed in [2], such as Jason, Jadex,
Jack, AgentFactory, 2APL, GOAL, Golog, and MetateM, we chose the Jason
platform [3] for our work. Jason extends the AgentSpeak language, an abstract
logic-based AOPL introduced by Rao [22]. Jason [3] has a particular set of fea-
tures that is interesting for our work: strong negation, belief annotations, and
(customisable) speech-act based communication. Also, Jason automatically gen-
erates annotations for all beliefs in the agents’ belief base about the source of the
beliefs. The annotation has the following format: safe(car1)[source(seller)],
stating that the source of the belief that car1 is safe is the agent seller. The
annotations in Jason can be easily extended to include other meta-information,
e.g., trust [19]. All of these features made Jason the preferred platform for this
work. However, other platforms could also benefit from this work by having the
approach proposed here adapted to their particularities.
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5.2 Modelling ToM in AOPL – TT ToM
An important aspect to be considered in order to model ToM in Jason [3], is
that we need not only to represent when an agent believes that another agent
believes something (which can be inferred from the belief annotations in Jason),
but also we need to represent when an agent believes that another agent does
not believe something, or when it is ignorant about that6. Therefore, we propose
a representation for ToM in Jason, using the following first-order predicates,
considering that all are agent a’s beliefs:
• believes(b,p): meaning that agent a believes that an agent b does believe
p, i.e., Πab |= Bb(p).
• believes(b,¬p): meaning that agent a believes that an agent b believes ¬p,
i.e., Πab |= Bb(¬p).
• ¬believes(b,p): meaning that agent a believes that an agent b does not
believe p, i.e., Πab |= ¬Bb(p).
• ¬believes(b,¬p): meaning that agent a believes that an agent b does not
believe ¬p, i.e., Πab |= ¬Bb(¬p).
• believes(b,inference(q,p)): meaning that agent a believes that an agent
b is able to infer q from p, i.e., Πab |= Bb(p→ q).
Jason automatically annotates all information that an agent has perceived/re-
ceived with the appropriated source from where that information came. Using
this annotation, we are able to implement some meta-reasoning that allows an
agent to make inferences7 from its private knowledge to its ToM. The infer-
ence rule believes(Ag, Prop) : −Prop[source(Ag)] allows an agent to infer that
another agent Ag believes proposition Prop when Ag is the source of that infor-
mation, i.e., ((∆a |= p[source(b)]) → (Πab |= Bb(p))).
Another important aspect for modelling not only ToM, but also deception,
is the representation of when an agent is aware about the other agents being
ignorant about a particular information. For example, an agent a is able to infer
that another agent b is ignorant about a proposition p, when b does not believe
on either p or ¬p — ¬believes(b,p) and ¬believes(b,¬p) hold on a’s belief
base — i.e., Πab |= ¬Bb(p)∧Πab |= ¬Bb(¬p). The following inference rule allows
agents to make such inference: ignorant−about(Ag, Prop) : −
¬believes(Ag, Prop)&¬believes(Ag,¬Prop)
Note that stating that an agent a is ignorant about whether agent b believes
p or not is different from a ToM saying that a knows/believes that agent b does
not believe either p or ¬p, i.e., (Πab 6|= Bb(p)∧Πab 6|= ¬Bb(p)) (agent a is ignorant
about if b believes or not in p) is different from (Πab |= ¬Bb(p)∧Πab |= ¬Bb(¬p))
(agent a knows that agent b is ignorant about p). Following the same ideas, an
agent a is able to infer when itself is ignorant about some proposition, i.e., (∆a 6|=
p ∧ ∆a 6|= ¬p) using the following inference rule: ignorant−about(Prop) : −
not(Prop)&not(¬Prop). Finally, an agent a is able to infer when it is ignorant
6 Usually, an agent will use inquiry dialogues to have access to such information.
7 These inferences are characterised as ST ToM, as we describe in next section.
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about other agents’ beliefs, i.e., considering another agent b we have (Πab 6|=
Bb(p) ∧Πab 6|= ¬Bb(p)): ignorant−about(believes(Ag, Prop)) : −
not(believes(Ag, Prop))& not(¬believes(Ag, Prop)).
5.3 Reasoning Using ToM – ST ToM
For the purpose of this study, it is important to consider what information is
being processed in order to form a ToM. We know that ToM consists of beliefs
about others’ minds (TT ToM) and we also know that ToM formation can be
represented through role-playing or simulating others’ minds (ST ToM). In this
study, both perspectives are considered.
Based on our approach for representing ToM in Jason agents, we explain
below how agents use that representation in order to make inferences from ToM,
i.e., ST ToM. For example, an agent is able to infer new information about
other agents’ beliefs from the information it already has on its ToM about those
agents. For example: believes(Ag, C) : − believes(Ag, inference(C, P)) &
believes(Ag, P) says that an agent is able to infer that another agent Ag believes
C when it knows, from its ToM, that agent Ag believes that P implies C, and agent
Ag believes P, i.e., ((Πab |= Bb(p→ q) ∧Πab |= Bb(p))→ Πab |= Bb(q)).
Also, agents are able to infer, from their ToM, the missing information for
achieving a particular desired state of ToM. For example, imagine that an agent
a desires to achieve a state of ToM in which another agent b believes q, i.e.,
Πab |= Bb(q). Considering that the current state of a’s ToM only indicates that
agent b believes p implies q, i.e., Πab |= Bb(p→ q), using ST an agent is able to
infer that it needs to achieve Πab |= Bb(p), thus with (Πab |= Bb(p→ q) ∧Πab |=
Bb(p)) it is able to achieve the desired ToM state Π
a
b |= Bb(q). This backward-
reasoning can also be observed in Table 2. Agents execute such reasoning us-
ing the following inference rule: implies(believes(Ag, N), believes(Ag, C)) : −
believes(Ag, inference(C, N)); meaning that an agent is able to infer that an-
other agent Ag believing N implies it also believing C, considering that the agent
knows Ag believes in inferring C from N. Note that, here, the agent does not need
to model that agent Ag believes N, it just simulates such an inference8.
In contrast to agents’ reasoning using ST ToM, which we can easily note is
not domain dependent, agents’ decision making is domain dependent, given that
different domains will require different decision making. In the next section, we
show how agents use TT (i.e., the initial ToM) and ST (i.e., inferences, simula-
tion, and updates they execute using ToM) to make decisions. In particular, we
will discuss how agents make decisions based on the scenario in Section 3.
8 For simplicity, we only model other agents’ beliefs in both TT and ST ToM, which
is sufficient to show our approach. Similar types of beliefs can be easily added.
For example, we are able to model (i) that an agent a has the desire to become
aware of q (i.e., DaBa(q)) using the predicate desires(a, believes(a, q)) at TT
ToM, (ii) that an agent does not believe something while it has a desire for that,
i.e., ¬believes(Ag, Prop):- desires(Ag, believes(Ag, Prop)).
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5.4 Decision Making and Communication Semantics
In this section we show how agents update their belief bases and ToM dur-
ing communication, as well as how agents make decisions based on the state
of their mental attitudes (i.e., ToM, belief base, desires, etc.). We give formal
semantics to both speech acts used for modelling deception in multi-agent sys-
tems, namely ask and response. We define new semantic rules to accompany
the existing operational semantics of Jason [3, 30]; however, for clarity we use
only the configuration components that we need to formalise the essentials of
our approach. Also, to account for the decision-making process, we define two
functions, Conf() and Trust(), which describe different behaviours that agents
may adopt depending on the parameters α, β, and γ introduced in Section 3,
and based on their profiles.
First, in Ask1, when an agent receives an ask message and it believes it is
likely to be successful in deceiving the sender (based on its profile), it sends a
response message with the information that makes it achieve the desired state
of ToM, regardless of whether the sender agent believes it to be true or not.
SM (MIn) = 〈mid , sid , ask, ψ〉
Πagsid |= Bsid(ψ → ϕ) Πagsid |= ¬Bsid(ψ) Πagsid |= ¬Bsid(¬ψ)
(Πagsid ∪ {Bsid(ψ)}) |= Bsid(ϕ) Conf() = true
〈ag ,M,ProcMsg〉 −→ 〈ag ,M ′,ExecInt〉
where:
M ′In = MIn \ {〈mid , sid , ask, ψ〉}
M ′Out = MOut ∪ {〈mid , sid , response, ψ〉}
(Ask1)
Ask1 says that when an agent selects a received message to be processed9
〈mid , sid , ask, ψ〉 (with mid and sid the message and sender identifier, respec-
tively), and it knows, from TT ToM, that the sender is able to infer ϕ from
ψ — Πagsid |= Bsid(ψ → ψ) — and that the sender is ignorant about ψ —
Πagsid |= ¬Bsid(ψ) ∧Πagsid |= ¬Bsid(¬ψ) — then, using ST ToM, the agent infers
that responding ψ will probably (considering the parameters mentioned and the
agent profile in Conf()) make the sender believe ψ — Bsid(ψ) — and making the
sender believe ψ gets the agent to achieve a ToM state corresponding to its desire
— (Πagsid ∪ {Bsid(ψ)}) |= Bsid(ϕ). Finally, after reasoning about which response
to provide, the agent removes that message from its mail inbox MIn , and add
the corresponding message to the mail outbox MOut . Otherwise, in Ask2, when
the agent believes it is unlikely to be successful in deceiving the sender (based
on its profile), it responds truthfully.
9 Here it suffices to know that this function selects one message from the agent’s inbox
MIn , see [3, 30] for more details about this function SM ().
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SM (MIn) = 〈mid , sid , ask, ψ〉
Πagsid |= Bsid(ψ → ϕ) Πagsid |= ¬Bsid(ψ) Πagsid |= ¬Bsid(¬ψ)
(Πagsid ∪ {Bsid(ψ)}) |= Bsid(ϕ) Conf() = false
〈ag ,M,ProcMsg〉 −→ 〈ag ,M ′,ExecInt〉
where:
M ′In = MIn \ {〈mid , sid , ask, ψ〉}
M ′Out = MOut ∪ {〈mid , sid , response, φ〉} with
φ =

ψ if ∆ag |= ψ
¬ψ if ∆ag |= ¬ψ
ignorant(ψ) if ∆ag 6|= ¬ψ ∧∆ag 6|= ψ
(Ask2)
When an agent receives a response message, it updates its belief base de-
pending on the result of Trust(); we assume this function to determine, de-
pending on the agent profile, whether the sender appears trustworthy. Thus, in
Response1, when the agent trusts the sender (based on the receiver profile), it
updates its belief base with that information. Otherwise, in Response2, when
the agent does not trust the sender (again, based on the receiver profile), it up-
dates its belief base assuming that the sender is lying, thus assuming that the
appositive is the case.
SM (MIn) = 〈mid , sid , response, ψ〉 Trust() = true
〈ag ,M,ProcMsg〉 −→ 〈ag ′,M ′,ExecInt〉
where:
M ′In = MIn \ {〈mid , sid , response, ψ〉}
∆′ag = ∆ag ∪ {ψ[source(sid)]}
(Response1)
SM (MIn) = 〈mid , sid , response, ψ〉 Trust() = false
〈ag ,M,ProcMsg〉 −→ 〈ag ′,M ′,ExecInt〉
where:
M ′In = MIn \ {〈mid , sid , response, ψ〉}
∆′ag = ∆ag ∪ {¬ψ[source(sid)]}
(Response2)
5.5 Example
As a real-world example for our implementation, we take the car-sale scenario as
in [28] and in [20]. Donald is a car dealer and Ivan is a potential buyer. When we
buy cars, if we are rational (and we assume the potential buyer is rational), then
we consider safety10 of the vehicle as being a priority. We set up the scenario
in Table 8. Further, this scenario corresponds to the fourth case in Table 6,
instantiating our model using the abstract agents defined in Table 1.
We describe our scenario making reference to the running model from Sec-
tion 4.1, showing also that our approach can instantiate many similar scenarios
of deception: Ivan is ignorant about whether a bmw is safe or not. Therefore
Ivan sends an ask message whether the bmw is safe or not to Donald. Next,
Donald receives the message, which corresponds to the semantics rule Ask1
10 [17] includes passenger safety as an important part of the car attributes in negotiation
scenarios.
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Table 8. Setup of Real-World Example
Donald (Dec) reckless with skill β = 0.8
Beliefs: BDec(safe(X)→ buy(X)), BDec(¬safe(bmw)), BDec(¬buy(bmw))
Desires: DDec(BInt(buy(bmw)))
Actions: ADec(safe(bmw)), ADec(¬safe(bmw))
ToM with confidence γ = 0.8: BDec(BInt(safe(X)→ buy(X)))
Ivan (Int) sceptical with trust α = 0.8
Beliefs: BInt(safe(X)→ buy(X)), BInt(safe(bmw))
Desires: DInt(BInt(safe(bmw)) ∨BInt(¬safe(bmw)))
Actions: QInt(safe(bmw))
ToM : BInt(¬BDec(safe(bmw)))
with Donald’s profile being reckless and θ = 0.51. Donald’s decision-making
process corresponds to the instantiation of the backward-reasoning from (5) to
(16) and in the semantics rule Ask1, which ends with Donald responding that
the bmw is safe (16). Ivan receives the message, which corresponds to the se-
mantics rule Response1, given that, though Ivan profile is sceptical, it trusts
Donald i.e., α = 0.8. Finally, Ivan concludes that the bmw is safe, correspond-
ing the instantiation of the reasoning process from (17) to (20) and the belief
update showed in Response1, which ends with Ivan believing that it should
buy a bmw.
6 Related Work
An important stepping-stone towards the modelling and implementation of agents
in MAS that use ToM to deceive was the modelling of agents that are able to
model the minds of other agents. The introduction of the formal semantics for
ToM in [21] as well as the modelling of uncertainty in [27] using the same agent
semantics have showed how agents can acquire, update, simulate and use models
of other agents’ minds to reach shared beliefs and to improve communication and
decision making between themselves. The model of uncertainty present in [27]
implies the existence of two important factors in agent communication, namely
the uncertainty of the communication channel and the levels of trust between
agents. The influence of trust on agent communication also implies the possibil-
ity of dishonest behaviour that might stop agents from reaching a real state of
shared beliefs. Our model applies the approach in [21] and [27] to give (i) the
interrogator the ability to ask for the information it desires based on its partial
knowledge of the deceiver’s beliefs in order to reach a state of shared beliefs and
(ii) to the deceiver the ability to simulate its target’s mind.
The works on machine deception closest to our approach are [8] and [20].
In [20], the authors model and implement a dishonest agent in an AOPL that
can lie, bullshit and deceive. However, their dishonest agent works under the
assumption of complete certainty and does not engage in mental simulation
to determine the optimal deceptive action. Thus, the model in [20] does not
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take into consideration factors such as levels of trust, communicative skill and
confidence in ToM. In [8], the author defines a theoretical machine that uses
Theory of Mind (ToM) to formulate illusory sophistic arguments. The machine
is represented by an argument scheme. The lying machine feeds information to
an audience by exploiting known reasoning fallacies which individuals engage in.
The philosophical approach of developing the lying machine has been successfully
evaluated using psychological studies of users. In contrast, our approach consists
in the design, implementation and evaluation of a MAS that is based on solid
theories of deceptive communication. Therefore, our approach is conceptually
and methodologically different from [8] and also offers a method to analyse the
deceptive machines inside the model, independently of user studies.
Other works on deception that have to be mentioned: [26] models deception
using argumentation in dialogue games; [15] models self-deception using epis-
temic logic; [24] and [23] define multiple types of deception using a modal logic
of belief and action; [5] describes the difference between lies, bullshit and decep-
tion; and [16] builds a cognitive model of deception based on human-computer
interaction, which specifies how the computer agent’s strategies of deception
should be improved by the agent’s programmer after being defeated by a human
in a battleships game.
Given that deception is a form of belief manipulation, we mention [13], where
the authors describe and implement a model of belief manipulation using propo-
sitional public announcements. Their mechanism is similar to ours in the sense
that it finds a public announcement φ that together with a knowledge base K
of an agent Ai will make the agent believe a goal ψi while being consistent with
K. However, this model mainly focuses on unidirectionally finding a public an-
nouncement for multiple agents and is not able to represent nested beliefs. In
contrast, our model focuses on the interactions between two agents where one
agent is the target of the other’s attempt at belief manipulation. Our model not
only (i) represents nested beliefs, but as a result of ToM modelling, the agents
are able to (ii) perform nested reasoning and simulate the other agent’s nested
beliefs in order to find an announcement that will make the other agent infer a
desired belief (iii) while taking into account the likelihood of the announcement’s
success at manipulation.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a high-level approach for modelling deception
using Theory of Mind in Multi-Agent Systems that integrates components of
two major theories of deception, namely Interpersonal Deception Theory and
Information Manipulation Theory 2. Our aim was to increase the understanding
of how future machines might be able to deceive others by building a mechanism
that is able to represent the psychological dynamics between agents under some
constraints inspired by the two theories of deception. Besides formalising and
evaluating the agent model using BDI-like architectures, we have also success-
fully implemented the model in a BDI based AOPL describing all the steps of
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the implementation. This shows good synergy between formal specification and
implementation while adopting the approach presented in [21] and [27]. Fur-
thermore, in order to offer the possibility of extending the model so that it can
serve various domains for the study of deception, we have proposed four agent
profiles which influence the execution of different behaviours by considering the
likelihood of trust and deception between agents. We have also evaluated all
the possible outcomes of interaction between these profiles, showing the con-
texts from which deception emerges. The most significant result of our model
indicates that some agent dynamics can result in cases of unintended deception.
According to our analysis of the model this means that sceptical attitudes of
agents can be detrimental in contexts of deception. This is crucial to take into
account in the modelling, design and application of AI in the areas of agreement,
cooperation and social interaction. These are areas in which agent attitudes to-
wards trust play a significant role in the outcomes of agent interactions such that
deceptive agents might be able to exploit either intentionally or unintentionally.
As future work, we are curious to explore how to increase the order of ToM
defined in the current agent architecture. Another of our research aims is the in-
clusion of a cognitive load [4] component, more profiles for the agents, an ST ToM
for the interrogator agent to be able to detect deception, and an environment
that agents can use to deceive and detect deception.
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